Distinction of Persons in the Trinity: A "Brief" Three-Fold Discussion

"For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself" Jn. 5:26

    Among many lay Christians, a common set of errors is usually said about the Trinity. These range from saying (improperly) that the persons of the Trinity are united to the essence (this entails composition in God), to treating the persons and the essence as four separate entities, and even misunderstanding how the persons are distinguished in the godhead. 

Unfortunately, because most lay Christians get their theology from YouTube videos and heated online discussions, they are often left with incorrect views about the most foundational aspects of the Christian faith. 

Here, I wanted to provide a brief and succinct exposition of how the persons of the Trinity are distinguished. Why? Because apart from the catholic understanding of how persons are distinguished, we are left with the consequences of every detestable error regarding the Trinity. To be clear, much can be said about this subject that will not be discussed here. I urge the reader to dive deeper into more sources (these will be given at the end for further reading) and not rely on this alone. Now, for order and clarity, we will list what we will discuss. 

Divided into three parts:  

I) Standard definition of "divine person" 

II) Explanation of "opposing points of origin" 

III) Exegetical proof from St. John's gospel

I. Definition of Person

   *For historical/theological development of terms and definitions regarding the Trinity and "person", I recommend the following from Francis Turretin (I.III.Q23) and Marcus Friedrich Wendelin (Christian Theology: Thes. ii)

The term person is defined in various ways throughout church history. Both early Greek and Latin Fathers disputed the term and differed in its exact definition. Here, not summarizing centuries worth of dispute, we will use the standard definition eventually assigned to "person" (eventually agreed Grk. ὑποστάσεις). The following definition will come from Wendelin, but has precedent in people like St. Boethius and Richard of St. Victor: 

Definition - "[A]... divine person is defined as an incommunicable subsistence of the divine essence." 

The parts therein described:  

a) 'divine person' - that is, not creaturely, but eternal, this excludes humans and angels. 

b) 'incommunicable' - that is, that which can not be communicated. The persons have a distinct point of origin. The Father is incommunicable because he is from no one (unbegotten), but the Son is begotten, therefore the Father is not communicated in his person to the Son.

c) 'subsistence' - that is, the manner (mode) in which a thing exists. So, there are three manners in which God exists that are really distinct, namely an unbegotten, begotten, and spirated manner of subsistence (way of existence)

d) 'divine essence' - that is, that which makes God, God. The divine essence is whatever God is, that without, he could not be what he is. 

So a divine person is an incommunicable (distinct and can not be given to another) subsistence (manner or way in which a thing exists) of the divine essence. Therefore, there are three "incommunicable subsistences of the divine essence" because there are three persons.

The reason for this definition being given here is in part to clarify the catholic view, but primarily to rid the idea of modern conceptions of "person" like "center of consciousness" or "an agent with will." These definitions have grave consequences on the doctrine of the Trinity. So, the historical definition is necessary to be used here. 

II. Opposing Points of Origin

   Above we mentioned that a "divine person" is "incommunicable", this is the case because what makes any person in the Trinity distinct cannot be given to another, or they would not be distinct from each other.

However, because the persons of the Trinity have the essence differently (that is in different ways by their subsistence), we call this their different manners of subsistence by which they have the essence. It must be noted that the persons of the godhead are identical to the essence, meaning, that they are not "things" in addition to another thing. They are the one, simple, infinite, eternal, perfect essence.

In light of this, it may be asked, "If the persons of the Trinity are identical to the essence, how are they not identical to each other?" The answer to this question is twofold. 1) The persons of the Trinity are identical, with respect to the essence (material identity), but not formally to each other, because of their distinct manners of subsistence which have opposing points of origin. 

In this way, the endpoint of a line is not the point from which it proceeds (but both points are the same line), the Father, Son, and Spirit have opposition from each other from their opposing points of origin. The Father is the principle of divinity, while the Son proceeds from and is principled (begotten), and the Father and Son, as a joint principle, spirate the Spirit, which proceeds from them both. 

The distinction of persons must be found on this or else we will fall into poly-theism. Nowhere within the pages of scripture are the persons of the godhead ever distinguished by what they have, they are only distinguished by how they have it. To demonstrate this, we will turn to an exegetical proof, John 5:26. 

III. Exegetical Proof from St. John's Gospel

    

    Now we approach the basis from scripture for the distinction mentioned earlier, " the persons of the godhead are never distinguished by what they have, they are only distinguished by how they have it." 

John 5:26 states, "For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in Himself." Two things must immediately be known, 1) the life the Father has 'in himself' [ἐν ἑαυτῷ] is nothing but the divine essence, for God's life is his essence as he is most simple and not made of parts. And 2) the Son has been granted/given this same life. 

Notice that both persons here, the Father and the Son, possess the same one life/essence. However, the Son does not have this from himself, but from the Father. The distinction between Father and Son here is an eternal one. How? Because nowhere in the incarnation is the Son given the very uncreated life the Father has in himself. In point, no creature ever could have God's uncreated life, per that they are creatures and have created life. But the Son here has that same uncreated life as the Father, so it cannot be something that occurs in the incarnation, but rather prior in eternity.

This distinction is not in what the persons have, it is in how they have it! The Son has life from the Father as opposed to the Father who has it from no one. This is how the Son is the "only-begotten" of the Father because he receives the essence from the Father. This is the distinction we mentioned earlier. 

St. Augustine aptly puts it, "...as the Father has life in Himself, so has He given also to the Son to have life in Himself; so that He lives, not by participation, but unchangeably, and is altogether Himself life. So has He given also to the Son to have life. Even as He has, so has He given. What is the difference? For the one gave, the other received." (St. Augustine, Tractates on John, 22.10)

The difference between the Father and the Son lies in the manner in which they have life. The Father gives, the Son receives, thus we have two points of origin, that of principle and principled. 

And St. Thomas Aquinas similarly, "... for as the Father has life in himself, so he has also given to the Son to have life in himself. For since life pertains to the nature, if the Son has life in himself as does the Father, it is clear that he has in himself, by his very origin, a nature indivisible from and equal to that of the Father... their [the Arians] denial that the Son is coeternal with the Father, [is shown] when they say that the Son began to exist in time. This is destroyed when he says, the Son has life in himself. For in all living things whose generation occurs in time, it is always possible to find something that at some time or other was not living. But in the Son, whatever is, is life itself. Consequently, he so received life itself that he has life in himself, so as always to have been living." (St. Thomas Aquinas, John, C5.L5.n782) 

In sum, the distinction explained above is evident from the witness of sacred scripture and supported by the witness of two great theologians of the Western church. 

Conclusion

    Three takeaways should be had from this article (Lord willing): 1) a proper definition of divine persons is known. 2) How the persons in the Trinity are properly opposed or distinct. And 3) how this distinction is witnessed from sacred scripture. 

I pray this "brief" read was edifying to you all. Lord bless and keep you, and may you continue to search into the unsearchable riches of Christ. 

For further reading consider: 

Giles Emmery, "The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God" here

"The Synopsis of Purer Theology" here

Francis Turretin's "Institutes of Elenctic Theology" here

Wendelin's "Christian Theology" here

Petrus Van Mastricht's "Theoretical-Practical Theology", Vol 2 here

Scott R. Swain's "The Trinity: An Introduction" here